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Group Behavior and Development: A Comparison of Farmers’ Organizations in
South Korea and Taiwan

Larry Burmeister, Gustav Ranis and Michael Wang

Abstract

This study presents a comparative analysis of farmers’ organisations in Korea and Taiwan
during 1950-80 in order to help us understand the role of group behavior in affecting development
outcomes. It highlights the linkages between group behavior, parastatal organisational structures and
economic performance. The paper examines the historical and political economy contexts that led to the
creation of both countries’ farmers’ organisations and highlights the institutional characteristics that
impacted their operational effectiveness. The study discusses elements in internal and external policies
that affected group motivation and traces the implications of such differences in group behavior for
bottom line performance. Though there existed many similarities in both organisational structure and
operations, it is argued that differential intra-group behavioral dynamics led to differences in agricultural
performance. Although, with the declining importance of agriculture, the relative importance of such
organisations has declined in recent years, the study is relevant for developing countries at every stage
of development.
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Group Behaviour and Development: A Comparison of Farmers’ Organisations in
South Korea and Taiwan
By
Larry Burmeister, Gustav Ranis, and Michael Wang*

I. Introduction
In response to prevailing agro-ecological and agrarian structural conditions, a variety of
rural organisations has arisen throughout East Asia to link small producers to broad national
development objectives. Farmers' organisations (FOs) have been critical components of this
organisational infrastructure, providing marketing, input supplies, technical information, and
credit services to farmer-members. In some countries, such FOs have played quite a significant
role as institutional vehicles for promoting agricultural development, while in others they have
been less effective (see Jones 1971; Lele 1981; Illy 1983). In this paper, we examine two FOs,
the Farmers’ Association (FA) in Taiwan and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
(NACF) in South Korea (hereafter Korea), in order to assess the extent to which such
organisations permit us to better understand the role of group behaviour in affecting development
outcomes.
The post-colonial regimes in Taiwan and South Korea faced similar agricultural
development problems. With land reform and the demise of the landlord class, the mobilisation
and coordination of a fragmented smallholder agricultural sector became essential for economic
development and political consolidation in both countries. The
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FA and the NACF, built upon the foundations of predecessor organisations in the
Japanese colonial period, were established by state initiatives in the postwar period to perform
agro-input supply, marketing support, credit, and technology diffusion functions. While official
publications describe these FOs as agricultural cooperatives, farmer-members did not establish
them as a result of grassroots collective action. Central government ministries, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) in Korea and the Provincial Department of Agriculture and
Forestry (PDAF) in Taiwan, exercised administrative oversight over the FOs, making them
extensions of the state in very important respects. Administrative units in both FOs paralleled
the governmental administrative hierarchy (national, provincial, county, township), thus making
it easy for the state to engage the FA and the NACF in the service of strategic national
development objectives.
Due to their parastatal origins, the organisational structures and operational norms of the
FA and the NACF were weighted toward the hierarchical power/control (P/C) “mode of
operation” outlined in Chapter One. P/C organisational patterns were, however, modified by
linkages to local level groups, both within and outside the formal FO structure. Such groups
(e.g. village associations) were comprised of farm households with relatively egalitarian resource
bases and social status, a result of significant social levelling brought about by post-WWII land
reforms in both countries. Moreover, these groups often had histories of institutionalised
cooperative labour arrangements to deal with the onerous seasonal labour demand and irrigation
system maintenance requirements of wet rice cultivation (Bray 1986; Oshima 1986).
This socio-economic environment fostered cooperative norms within villages,
interjecting important elements of a COOP behavioural mode into the FOs, especially at the
lower levels in the organisational hierarchy where routine interactions between farmer-members
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and FO staff occurred. Thus, the FA and the NACF organisational cultures combined P/C and
COOP modes of operation. This combination of group behavioural characteristics helped the FA
and the NACF achieve a level of operational effectiveness that has been evaluated favourably in
cross-national comparisons of similar organisations that provide essential services to agricultural
producers (Desai and Mellor, 1993; Esman and Uphoff, 1984:315-317). The relative success of
FOs in Taiwan and Korea illustrate what Evans (1996) and others have conceptualised as
synergistic “co-production” relationships between the state and groups organised to achieve
development goals.
While there are significant similarities in FA's and NACF's organisational structure and
operations, we argue that some differences in agricultural sector performance in Taiwan and
Korea during the period under review (1950-1980) may have been due in part to the different
levels of organisational effectiveness of these two FOs. The literature on the role of FOs in East
Asia has largely been silent on the implications of group behaviour for their operational
efficiency, mostly focusing on the role of FOs in the context of an old-fashioned agricultural
production function. For example, Kwoh (1966) and Kuo and Lee (1982) have analysed the
ways in which various operations in Taiwan’s FAs contributed to increasing production without
addressing the key question of just why they were able to render their services so effectively.
In this study we examine intra-group behavioural dynamics within FOs as another
variable affecting agricultural sector performance. We limit our examination to the 1950-80
period, given the decline in the relative quantitative importance of agriculture from the late
1970s onwards in both Korea and Taiwan, which accordingly reduced the importance of farmers’
groups as development agents in both countries in recent years. However, our findings remain
relevant for countries still at an earlier stage of development.

4

In what follows we first briefly set the stage by comparing the role of agriculture in the
overall development of the Korean and Taiwanese economies in Section II. In Section III, we
examine the political economy norms affecting the organisational development of FOs in both
countries, and briefly review FO organisational histories and structures. We then examine
internal organisational differences in more detail in Section IV, focusing on institutional
variables (e.g., organisational structure, process, and norms) that affected the behaviour of both
FO staff and farmer-members. In Section V, the implications of such differences in group
behaviour for organisational performance are discussed. We conclude, in Section VI, by putting
the “modes of group operation” model into a broader theoretical context that helps explain
differences in parastatal FO performance in Taiwan and Korea.

II.

Comparing Agricultural Sector Performances
Following World War II, agriculture initially dominated the Korean and Taiwanese

economies, with well over half of the labor force employed and slightly less than half of gross
domestic product generated in the sector. The sector was mostly composed of single-family
households who engaged in full-time farming and owned the land they cultivated. Tenant
farmers were relatively few and the average size of landholdings small and strikingly
homogeneous, due to the land reforms of the early post-war period. This initially gave rise to
substantial uniformity of production conditions and organisation. Rice was at first the dominant
crop, supplying nearly half of total agricultural income in both countries (see Ban 1979; Ho
1978).
Over time, the economic importance of agriculture declined in both countries (although
more rapidly in Taiwan which had a more robust rural development experience), providing only
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7 percent of GNP in Taiwan and only 18 percent in Korea by 1981 (Moore 1988:121). The
structure of agriculture also changed gradually, with a shift in production away from grains to
livestock; an increase in the commercialisation and mechanisation of production; and an increase
in the share of non-farm activities in rural household incomes (see Ban 1979; Lee and Chen
1979).
From an international perspective, agricultural performance in both countries has been
impressive. Average rice yields in Korea and Taiwan during the 1952-70 period were more than
double those of South and Southeast Asia, almost matching those of Japan. Agricultural output
growth was also comparable to that of Asian neighbours over the same period, and higher than
the world average and that of more land-abundant nations in Africa and Latin America (see
Table 1 below). Taiwan’s agricultural output initially expanded more rapidly than Korea’s
because of less wartime disruption, a higher initial level of income, and better macroeconomic
and structural policies (see Fei and Ranis 1975; Oshima 1987:149-152). By the mid 1970s,
however, agricultural growth in Korea had accelerated, surpassing Taiwan’s.

6

Table 1 International Comparison of Agricultural Output Growth
1952/61

1961/71

1952/71

Korea

3.1*

3.7

3.5

Taiwan

4.1

3.9

4.0

Thailand
North America

5.2
1.1

3.6
2.1

4.4
1.6

Latin America

3.5

2.4

2.9

Africa
Asia

2.8
4.2

2.9
2.6

2.9
3.4

India

3.6

2.2

2.9

Japan

2.4

2.0

2.2

2.6

2.7

World
2.8
*1954-1961
Source: Ban et al (1980), Table 3.

Despite their broadly similar records, the agricultural sector in the two countries played
rather different roles in their overall development. As a catalyst for growth and industrialisation,
the agricultural sector in Taiwan was important, contributing substantial net capital outflows to
the development of nonagricultural activities (Oshima 1987; Lee and Culver 1985; Lee and Chen
1979). Agriculture in Korea, however, contributed just 10 percent of overall total capital
formation during the post-1960 period (Ban et al. 1980:23).
Moreover, Taiwan’s agricultural households contributed substantial labour inputs to the
development process through a remarkable shift in rural household labour from agricultural to
rural nonagricultural activities, with off-farm labour participation rising from 29 percent of total
rural employment in 1956 to 67 percent in 1980 (Ranis 1995). This helped to produce a
decentralised pattern of industrialisation that, in contrast to Korea and most other developing
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countries, was primarily rurally based. Although Korea’s farm sector also supplied labour inputs
to the non-farm sectors, it was less extensive, with a larger share of the labour force retained in
lower productivity agricultural activities in 1980 (Oshima 1987:160). Lack of rural
industrialisation in the Korean countryside limited the extent of the agricultural to nonagricultural labour transfer that characterised the Taiwanese rural development experience (Ho
1982), and resulted in less income equality over time in rural areas and less convergence between
rural and urban household incomes.
Thus, although agricultural development was successful in both countries, agricultural
labour productivity in Taiwan rose faster and there were substantially higher savings from the
sector.1 This was partly due to differences in initial endowments, such as Taiwan's more
favourable rice-cultivating and multiple-cropping climate, and differences in government
policies, such as Taiwan's higher rate of agricultural sector investment, less bias against
agriculture in the inter-sectoral terms of trade (Ho 1978; Ranis 1989), and a more favourable
climate for rural industrialisation. But, we believe, another component was the more effective
role of rural institutions in Taiwan, specifically the farmers' organisations, which appear to have
been instrumental in increasing agricultural productivity through their input, marketing and
extension

1

See Agricultural Development in China, Japan and Korea, Chi-Ming Hou, Tzong-Shian Yu, editors, Academia
Sinica, Taipei, 1982, especially the chapter on Korea “The Growth of Agricultural Output and Productivity in
Korea, 1918-1978”, by Sung-Hwan Ban and the chapter on Taiwan “Secular Trends of Output, Inputs and
Productivity” by Yueh-eh Chen and You-tsao Weng. The data indicate a 3.9% annual growth of agricultural labour
productivity in Korea from 1946-1977 while Taiwan’s increased by 4.3% annually from 1951-1977.
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functions. According to Oshima (1986, Table 1)2 , total factor productivity in Taiwanese
agriculture was higher than in Korea during the 1953-80 period. As a result, Taiwan’s
agriculture was able to supply more resource transfers through savings and consumption to
support the national development project. In Sections IV and V, we examine the reasons for the
favourable performance of FOs in both countries, exploring the differences between FOs in
Taiwan and Korea, focusing on both the internal and external environments that influenced FO
group dynamics. But first, we need to review the historical and political economy contexts of
FO creation and development in Korea and Taiwan.

III.

Organisational Histories and Overview
A. The Political Economy of FO Development Dynamics
Important differences in the politics of regime consolidation in the two countries affected

FO structure and procedures, as did the broader macro-norms operating in the political
economies of both countries.
After Taiwan reverted to the Republic of China (ROC), following the Japanese surrender,
the indigenous Taiwanese reacted strongly against perceived Kuomintang (KMT) misrule on the
island. Social unrest led to a purge of the Taiwanese elite by the ROC authorities, i.e., the
infamous February 28, 1947 (2/28) “Incident” (see Gold 1986:47-55). This early assault on the
indigenous Taiwanese made Chiang Kai-shek’s withdrawal to Taiwan from the mainland,
following the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War, a potentially explosive political issue, as
the mainlanders filled top positions in the state apparatus and the military. In order to mitigate
tensions generated by the KMT’s withdrawal to Taiwan, the regime had to cede some political
2

From 1952-80, Taiwan’s total factor productivity in agriculture grew on average 2.2 percent a year, while Korea’s
average annual total factor productivity decreased by -0.2 percent from 1953-80.
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and economic space to the indigenous Taiwanese. In the political sphere, a degree of local
autonomy was institutionalised through the election of local government executives and the
establishment of local legislative assemblies. While the KMT did retain control of larger-scale
strategic, state-owned enterprises, most of the economy, i.e., agriculture and medium- and smallscale industry, remained open to indigenous Taiwanese entrepreneurship.
The need for political legitimisation, together with strong pressure from the Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) (Shen 1970), led to a modicum of self-rule within
the FA system. The JCRR, a rural development agency largely supported by U.S. foreign aid
funds and staffed by American advisors who worked in concert with Chinese counterparts,
pushed for democratic procedures in FA operations. The JCRR’s unique influence in the KMT
regime encouraged FA development in line with agricultural cooperative ideals of grassroots ties
between staff and farmer-members and participatory organisational governance, quite at odds
with the one-party, bureaucratic-authoritarian structure of the overall ROC state apparatus. As
we shall see, this led to procedures that included an element of farmer-member participation in
FA governance through FA assembly elections (see Section IV below).
Post-war political dynamics in Korea provided less political space than in Taiwan for the
institutionalisation of formal democratic processes at the local level. During the U.S. military
occupation (1945-1948), rural social discontent over the slow pace of land reform and the
retention of much of the colonial administrative ruling apparatus (lower ranking government
officials and police who were viewed as Japanese collaborators) erupted into violent uprisings
against the authorities in the countryside in the autumn of 1946 (Cumings 1981; Shin 1996). In
the initial stages of the Korean War, territory in the South passed back and forth from
Communist to ROK (Republic of Korea) rule, leaving lingering questions about village political
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loyalties in some regions (Brandt 1971:189). Threats of anti-regime political agitation and
communist infiltration seemed uppermost in government thinking about the consequences of
open politics in the countryside. While local level officials were elected during the Rhee regime
(1948-1960), local autonomy was completely abrogated by the military government of General
Park Chung Hee, who came to power in the 1961 coup.
The NACF was established shortly after the Park military coup. It was organised as a
centralised, top-down bureaucracy. During the NACF’s formative period many of the top
administrative officials were either active or retired high-ranking military officers. Unlike the
Taiwanese case, there was no external body like the JCRR arguing for farmer-member
participation in NACF governance.
It also appears that the different trajectories in regime consolidation produced some
differences in modes of behaviour at the macro level. While both countries had P/C as the
dominant mode, the system appears to have been less hierarchical in Taiwan, with more
independent, or quasi-independent, bodies influencing policy and a greater role for the market.
For example, Korean economic policy-making was centralised, the Prime Minister chairing the
Central Economic Committee and the Deputy Prime Minister the Economic Planning Board. In
Taiwan central planning agencies were more decentralised and generally fell outside formal
bureaucratic structures (Cheng et al 1996; Scitovsky 1985; Patrick 1994).
Overall, while P/C elements dominated in both countries, Korea’s macro-policy-making
appears to have been more centralised and interventionist, while in Taiwan a more decentralised
approach was in evidence, with greater elements of COOP motivation. These differences in the
political economy context were reflected in differences in the behavioural dynamics of the FA
and the NACF. The structures and operational norms of the FOs are examined next.
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B. Overview of Organisational Structures
As formal organisations, both the Korean and Taiwanese FOs had similar historical
antecedents in the colonial period. Farmers’ organisations became official entities during the
Japanese occupation when rural self-help groups that had been established among the landowning elite were made part of the colonial administrative apparatus. During the Japanese
colonial period, these groups helped to mobilise local resources for the increased production of
agricultural commodities as part of overall policies that incorporated the Taiwanese and Korean
rural economies into the infamous Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (see Kwoh 1966 and
Jong 1991).
Following World War II, between 1946 and 1953, the Taiwanese FOs underwent a
substantial reorganisation. A critical player in these decisions was the JCRR. Based upon the
JCRR's recommendations, the FAs developed into their present three-tier, vertically organised
structure, comprising farmers' associations at the township, county/city and provincial levels (see
Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1 Taiwan Farmers’ Association Organisational Structure

Provincial FA

20 County/City FAs

270 Township FAs (TFAs)
4,607 Small Agricultural Units (SAUs)
1,094,000 Member Farmers

Source: Kwoh (1966) and Mao and Schive (1995).
By the 1980s, there were 291 farmers’ associations in existence, made up of 1 at the
provincial, 20 at the county/city, and 270 at the township levels. Their membership totalled
1,094,000, including over 90 percent of all farm households. Under the township FAs (hereafter
TFAs), there were 4,607 small agricultural units (hereafter SAUs), one in each village on
average, acting as a bridge between the TFA staff and farmer-members, and serving as the basic
unit for election purposes (see Lee and Chen 1979:43). Agencies within the PDAF provided
overall supervision of FA operations. A similar, but proportionally smaller, organisational
structure existed in the earlier period.
In Korea, the functions and structures of FOs linked to the colonial era administration
also underwent reorganisation between 1946 and 1961, resulting in a similar three-tier, vertically
linked organisation. 3 By the 1980s, there were more than two million member farm households
in 1545 primary and 140 special cooperatives, supervised by 9 provincial offices under the

3

In 1981, the system underwent further reorganisation, becoming a two-tier organisation comprising only national
and local levels, with county-level units merged with provincial units into the federation (national) level and the
PACs (township units) as the primary local level NACF agencies.

13

control of the central NACF bureau. More than 90 percent of farm households were members of
primary agricultural cooperatives (hereafter PACs), with the average PAC unit containing about
1200 members (see Figure 2 below). Once again, a similar, if proportionally smaller,
organisational structure existed in earlier years.
No JCRR equivalent existed in Korea, which received U.S. aid in a more traditional
fashion, i.e. via line Ministry allocations coming through the Economic Planning Board. Instead,
the highly centralised Korean bureaucracy directed organisational policy changes as well as
resource allocations to the NACF. As a consequence, compared to Taiwan, the macro and micro
policy environment in Korea was less flexible and accommodating of organisational changes
which might have strengthened COOP horizontal linkages between staff and farmer members.
Figure 2 NACF Organisational Structure
NACF Central Office

9 Provincial Branch Offices

140 County Cooperatives
1,545 Primary Agricultural Cooperatives (PACs) & 145 Special Cooperatives
2,080,000 Member Farmers

Source: (Lee, Kim and Adams 1977).
C. Group Behaviour and FO Effectiveness
Unlike irrigation and other natural resource systems or public goods, the provision of
farmers' organisation services does not fall neatly into the category of a common-pool resource
(CPR) problem (see Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1990). Although some of the benefits deriving
from FO services share the common feature with CPRs of being costly to exclude beneficiaries,
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one member’s usage does not necessarily subtract from the amount available to others. “Freerider” problems are therefore not as debilitating as with CPRs. Moreover, because of their
parastatal character, collective action problems involved in organising FO services are also not as
relevant because government agencies ultimately ensure provision.
Where collective action and effective group functioning do factor in, however, is with the
quality of FO services. The effectiveness of FO services depends to a large degree on the
interdependent efforts of both officials and members, something referred to in the literature as
'co-production' (Ostrom 1996). For example, FO marketing services require not only technical
knowledge related to storage and transportation on the part of staff, but also the time-specific and
place-specific local knowledge of the commodities to be marketed that only farmer-members
possess. With regard to extension and credit services, the scientific information and
administrative skills of FO staff are clearly key, but so is the utilisation of such services by
farmer-members, to generate efficiency gains through economies of scale.
Working together as a group is thus important for FO performance, and inputs from both
sets of actors are necessary. In order for group efforts to succeed, incentives must be in place
that motivate actors to work collectively towards similar goals. The collective action problem,
therefore, is less one of ensuring individual contributions of effort, as in irrigation groups, than
one of ensuring that efforts are focused on increasing collective rural welfare. Such group
dynamics are not intrinsic to the FO setting, but are conditioned by group relationships within the
organisation, as well as interactions with the external environment in which the group operates.
Organisational variables are particularly important because they help to define the parameters
within which interactions between staff and farmer-members take place. Different organisational
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structures and processes foster different rule- and norm-based relationships, generating
principal/agent relationships of varying degrees of effectiveness.

IV. Internal Organisational Differences Affecting Group Behaviour
As we have seen, on the surface the NACF and the FA had similar formal organisational
structures, but there were variations in internal structure and process, affecting group behaviour,
leading to differences in organisational performance.

A. Degree of Operational and Financial Autonomy
The FOs in both Korea and Taiwan were far from being autonomous grassroots
organisations. Rather, they were more akin to parastatals (Mengistu 1993), operating with a
heavy dose of central government control and carrying out a number of activities on behalf of the
government, such as rice collection and fertiliser distribution. In both countries, village level FO
affairs were strongly regulated by county offices, which, in turn, were directly supervised by the
FO provincial and/or national bureaux and ultimately central government ministries. It was not
uncommon to have extensive interaction between central government and FO officials at all
levels (Aqua 1974).
On closer examination, however, there appear to have been variations in the degree of
autonomy under which the two systems operated. The key difference was that, at the local level,
Taiwan’s FO had relatively more autonomy over the operation of day-to-day activities than
Korea’s, even though in both cases higher level supervisory bodies often made important
organisational decisions. This difference stemmed in part from the strength of Taiwan’s TFAs
(the lowest organisational level in direct contact with farmer-members) relative to local level
NACF units (PACs) during the first decade of organisational development. Self-financing
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possibilities for local activities depended on these TFA's capacities to generate funds through the
development of local banking operations. This occurred from the outset within the FA system
through the TFAs, while PAC (township level) banking operations were only consolidated
during the 1970s in the NACF system.
TFAs had to live with a more binding budget constraint based on locally generated funds
than did their Korean counterparts, which were more dependent on central transfers. From the
outset of FA establishment, TFAs were expected to operate more or less as self-sustaining
economic enterprises (Davison 1993:198). FO staff members in Taiwan were therefore more
dependent on the success of local services provided under their supervision, which often
generated revenues that supported other FA activities. Moreover, because a greater share of
operational funds was generated locally, Taiwan’s TFAs also had more operational latitude in
making decisions about the allocation of local expenditures.
Degree of Member Participation in Local Decision-Making
Again, as a result of their institutional history as parastatals, both the FA and the NACF
had limited participatory structures for members. In Korea, only after the 1989 NACF reforms
(see Burmeister 1999), were members able to elect PAC presidents, and, for the first time, have
some institutionalised voice in the organisational governance.
In Taiwan, farmer-members, meeting in small units comprised of members of the same
village, voted once every four years for representatives to the TFA assembly, whose main
functions were to approve or disapprove TFA activity plans and elect a board of directors and a
board of supervisors (Kwoh 1966: 2). The board of directors met every two months and was
charged with the policy-making functions of township associations, the most important of which
was the selection of a general manager in charge of the TFA's daily functioning and policy
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implementation. The board of supervisors, on the other hand, dealt only with the auditing of
accounts. This process was repeated at both the county and provincial levels (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 Election System in Taiwan’s Farmers’ Associations
Provincial FA
General Manager

County FA General
Manager
Township TFA
General Manager

County Board of
Directors

Provincial FA Board
of Directors

Provincial FA
Representative

Board of Directors
County FA
Representative
TFA Representative
Assembly

Farmers (Small
Agricultural Units)

= Direction of Elections

Source: Stavis (1982:219).
Although Taiwanese farmers thus had more formal channels through which to participate
in FA affairs, the extent to which this actually resulted in greater accountability and
responsiveness on the part of FA officials was limited, mainly because they had a direct
participatory role at only the most basic level, i.e., in electing township assemblies, while for
those township bodies actually charged with policy-making powers, i.e., the board of directors,
farmer-member input was often indirect at best. Especially further up in the organisational
hierarchy, the impact of farmer participation became more diluted, as the provincial board of
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directors was selected by representatives three times removed from direct election by farmermembers (see Figure 3) (see de Lasson 1976:226-230).
Moreover, the election for FA township representatives was a heavily politicised matter,
with intense political competition (de Lasson 1976:173-184) which might involve vote-buying
and the use of patron-client, friendship, and kinship ties to solicit votes (Stavis 1974: 100). The
selection process was therefore often dominated by concerns which were independent of
professional qualifications or farmer preferences.
Even though the election system may have been subject to corrupt practices and was
judged to be of limited effectiveness in institutionalising democratic principles of representation,
this flawed election process was, it appears, important for group motivation in Taiwan. From a
sample of farmer members drawn from different TFAs, de Lasson (1976:219) found that over 65
percent perceived the FA as belonging to members, and that 49.5 percent believed that this was
because members “controlled” the FA.
Rather than formal mechanisms, however, informal channels may have been the more
important means for members to affect decision-making processes. Although in neither case did
interactions between farmer-members nor FO decision-making staff occur on a frequent basis, it
appears that Taiwanese farmers had much more access. Wade (1982:84) reported, for example,
that in the case of Korean irrigation associations (which he took to be similar to NACF
operational modes in important ways), face-to-face communication by farmers with directors
was rare. In contrast, de Lasson (1976:202) reported that, in a sample of 337 FA members,
nearly 30 percent talked with the TFA General Manager at least once during the season, and over
70 percent at least once during the year, and that communication with the chiefs of the village-
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level small agricultural units (SAUs), charged with conveying concerns to FA officials, was even
more frequent.

B. Hierarchical Relations within the FOs
The extent of hierarchy in organisational relationships also affected group behaviour by
influencing the degree to which local concerns were transmitted vertically and the extent to
which coordination occurred between levels. On the surface, the NACF and the FAs were
structurally similar, but it seems that the FAs had fewer formal restrictions regulating the
interactions between organisational levels.
More specifically, the NACF delayed the introduction of effective local level primary
agricultural cooperative (PAC) units that dealt directly with farmer-members. Because of this,
village level PACs often did not initiate meaningful relations with farmer-members in the
NACF’s early stages of development; and local units were not consolidated into more effective
township level PACs until the early 1970s. As a result, in the NACF case, the higher
administrative (i.e., federation) levels of the organisation dominated organisational operations for
a decade before township (local level) PACs became effective parts of the organisation.
In Taiwan, on the other hand, the central government, responding to pressures from the
JCRR, encouraged the development of grassroots township units within the FA organisational
structure from the outset. Furthermore, township FAs were linked to village level groups, i.e.,
the small agricultural units (SAUs). Thus, the FA system fostered a more “organic” social
connection between farmer-members and the organisation. These differences in organisational
development permitted a more balanced relationship between local levels and higher levels in
Taiwan, in contrast to a more top-down, hierarchical relationship in the Korean NACF.
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That this is the case is also suggested by differences in the bureaucratic procedures in the
personnel systems of the two FOs. In Korea, there was very little vertical movement by staff
members between the national and local levels, with NACF staff at the township level rarely
moving to federation staff positions and vice versa. This hindered the ability of federation field
staff to acquire local knowledge or to familiarise themselves with membership interests
particular to specific localities. In fact, the NACF personnel system was effectively separated
into a higher status federation level subsystem and a lower status PAC level subsystem, with
different recruitment practices and career ladders within these subsystems (Wade, personal
communication). This strong bureaucratic separation within the organisation fostered a
hierarchical divide between the federation and the PAC levels of the NACF that attenuated
information flows between the levels and may have accentuated the influence of central
government directives and reduced that of farmer-member preferences.
In Taiwan, on the other hand, there seemed to be more opportunities for staff to move
between organisational levels. Hierarchical relations in Taiwan were mitigated by the system
linking upper and lower level FA directorates. The chairs of the boards of directors at the lower
level farmers’ associations acted as representatives to higher level FA assemblies, thereby
serving as institutionalised links between upper and lower levels of the organisation. This
connection helped to promote more flexible intra-organisational personnel movements (Davison
1993:194).
Furthermore, the mainlander-Taiwanese ethnic divide manifested itself in the FA
hierarchy in a way that may have made higher level FA units more responsive to farmer-member
entreaties. de Lasson (1976:245) reports that FA staff at the TFA level was entirely Taiwanese
in ethnic composition, whereas mainlanders comprised 40 percent of staff in the provincial FA
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offices. TFA officials were, in a sense, representing a unified ethnic bloc, which, as we have said
earlier, resented mainlander domination, which may have made them keener to represent farmermembers in decision-making.

C. Personnel Policies
FO hiring and promotion practices also affected group action by influencing the incentives
facing FO officials in their provision of services. In both countries, practices favoured a
commitment to local development initiatives, compared with elsewhere (Wade 1982). For the
most part, FO offices in township level FOs in both Korea and Taiwan were staffed locally, with
the majority of staff born in the locality in which they served. Furthermore, FO staff members in
both the FA and the NACF were not greatly differentiated from their farmer membership in
terms of education or income levels. In fact, many of them were farmers themselves, with a
prime motivation for working in rural areas being the ability to be near their farms (de Lasson
(1976:140). The local affiliation of the staff in both organisations was important because it
meant that workers had a vested interest in the area of the township FOs. Moreover, the
“embeddedness” of local staff in the local community contributed to a sense of shared mutual
obligations and experiences that enhanced staff accountability. In both countries, higher ranking
staff at the township level tended to remain in the same position for long durations, often 15
years or more in Taiwan (Stavis 1982:96). This practice contributed to group motivation, as
interaction with the same group of farmers over a long period necessarily encouraged the
development of good relations between staff and farmer-members.

E. Identity Formation
In Taiwan, membership in the FAs involved two different levels—a category of full
members who received more than half of their income from farming and a category of associate
members who were rural residents not engaged in full-time farming. Although full and associate
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members had access to all FA services, only full members could vote for FA representatives.
This dual membership system helped strengthen the role of farmer-members in the organisation,
instituting a sense that the FAs were truly a vehicle for serving mainly collective farming
interests. Furthermore, the village-level SAUs, as sites of FA activities that brought neighbours
together in their status as farmer-members, undoubtedly contributed to feelings of collective
identity.
By contrast, identity formation within the NACF seemed much less strong. This was
brought home to one of the authors (Burmeister) in fieldwork settings, when farmers talking
about the NACF as an organisation and its activities, used the term “government”
interchangeably with “agricultural cooperative.” The bureaucratic distance we have described
earlier that characterised NACF inter-unit relationships, and the fact that it took time for viable
PAC units to develop, generated a greater feeling of NACF remoteness among farmers.

F. Organisational Differences and Modes of Group Behaviour
In terms of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 1, the combination of
organisational differences between the FA and the NACF outlined above led to some differences
in group behaviour between the two organisations. Both were largely P/C, but in the FA system,
elements of COOP relationships between FA staff and farmer-members were institutionalised as
a result of a combination of greater farmer-member participation in organisational governance
and a heightened sense of group identity among farmer-members. Moreover, the greater
operational and financial autonomy of the TFAs, combined with a more binding budget
constraint, which linked profitability to performance, created more M behavioural norms. Further
evidence of whether and how these differences affected organisational performance is presented
in the next section.
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V. Comparative FO Performance
Both the FAs and the NACF were organised as multipurpose organisations, providing a
variety of services. These included the marketing of farm products, the sale of agricultural
inputs such as fertiliser and the provision of agricultural extension services, although this latter
function was much more prominent in the FA system than in the NACF. In addition, both
organisations provided credit, insurance and food processing services, which will not be
examined here.
In comparative cross-national assessments of performances, both the FA and the NACF
do rather well. Esman and Uphoff (1984:315-317) judged FA performance “outstanding” in
comparison with other Asian FOs engaged in similar activities. Favourable comparisons have
also been made between Korean rural organisations (including the NACF) and South Asian
counterparts (see Wade 1982). Positive attributes that distinguish them from other FOs in this
comparative literature include ubiquitous local branch offices, which makes their services easily
accessible to members; the relative homogeneity of membership which makes identification of
relevant services easier for FO officials; and the social accessibility of FA and NACF staff to the
membership, i.e., local staff were often natives of the areas in which they worked and had similar
social status to their farmer-member clientele. The well-functioning nature of both FAs and
NACF was in part responsible for the relatively good agricultural performance in both countries.
Nevertheless, organisational differences illuminated in the preceding section did lead to some
differences between the FA and the NACF in the effectiveness of service provision, a subject to
which we now turn.
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Due to the nature of the organisations in both cases, organisational goals were multiple
and at times contradictory. Given their parastatal nature, government goals for agricultural
sector performance, e.g., increasing agricultural productivity, fostering strategic intersectoral
linkages, maximising foreign exchange earnings, or generating domestic savings, were given
high priority within the respective FO bureaucracies. But the FA and NACF were also
membership organisations, at least in their legal charters and self-descriptions. As a result,
farmer-member concerns with respect to reasonably priced services and their timely provision
were considered, if not always honoured, in decision-making.

A.

Agro-input Supply and Product Marketing
These two functions are treated together because government-“entrusted” business

comprised the major component of FA and NACF activities in these areas. Both governments
used the FA and NACF to achieve strategic policy objectives related to food systems. Tight
government controls were placed on the staple foodgrain economy (especially rice) in order to
stabilise prices for this politically sensitive commodity. Hyperinflation fuelled by staple food
scarcities had been experienced by the KMT on the mainland and during the initial stages of U.S.
military government rule in post-liberation Korea. These memories help explain why
government intervention in the staple foodgrain sub-sector was so pronounced. Moreover, rice
had to be provided at below market prices for the military in both countries. On the agro-input
side, fertiliser was in chronic short supply in the early post-war period. As a result, both
governments invested substantial resources in the establishment of domestic fertiliser industries
as part of import substitution industrialisation strategies that created backward intersectoral
linkages (see Burmeister 1990:211-213). Farmers were then “conscripted” to purchase the
output of this new industry as soon as production came on stream to ensure economic viability.
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Both the FA and the NACF were merely collection and distribution agents for these strategic
“entrusted” businesses, with rice marketing and fertiliser supply by far the most important in
terms of the value of products and of agro-inputs handled. The FA and the NACF received a set
commission for handling rice and fertiliser, with government agencies determining amounts
marketed and prices at different stages in the marketing chain.
In terms of aggregate contributions to agricultural development objectives, the fertiliser
distribution to farmers increased substantially between the 1960s and the mid-1970s. As a
result, Taiwanese and Korean farmers enjoyed some of the highest application rates of fertiliser
per unit area in the world. Through FA and NACF channels, farmers thus received inputs that
contributed substantially to aggregate productivity increases and promoted staple foodgrain selfsufficiency, important government policy goals during this period. The high level of fertiliser use
is indicative of the effectiveness of FOs in both countries.
Where organisational differences show up is in the precise way in which fertiliser
distribution was handled. Whereas government agencies determined how much fertiliser the FA
and NACF were to distribute in the aggregate, the FA farmer distribution procedure involved
more individual farmer input in determining the amount consumed. The procedure for obtaining
fertiliser in Taiwan required a formal application by farmers to TFA units detailing the area of
cultivation, the type of crops to be planted, and an estimate of the amount of fertiliser needed.
The TFAs then passed on the application to higher level FA offices who delivered the requisite
amounts to the township offices for sale (Lee and Chen 1979:41). In Korea, this distribution was
more centrally directed and involved less farmer input, with the NACF deciding on the requisite
amounts of fertiliser, based on overall cadastral and crop information provided by the MAFF, as
well as on the production estimates coming from the state-controlled fertiliser plants. This
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amount was then distributed to county and township NACF units for sale to farmer-members
(Yang 1979:112). Field investigations by Aqua (1974:63), Sorensen (1989:86), and Reed
(1979:99) attest to the top-down, inflexible nature of the NACF distribution process from a
farmer-member perspective. The bulk of NACF distribution was handled by geographically
remote county level offices prior to the 1970s, before many township units had become viable
operations. By contrast, in Taiwan, the distribution was handled by local TFAs, thus providing
further evidence for our earlier claim that differences in the historical development of the
organisational structure of the two FOs led to more “bottom up” information flows and more
effective demand satisfaction there than in the “top down” NACF mode of operation.
Another important performance difference between the FA and NACF input service was
in the fertiliser/rice terms of trade established during the period under review. It is widely
acknowledged in the literature that both the Taiwanese and Korean governments sold fertiliser to
farmers at prices above the world market level. That said, terms of trade for fertiliser improved
over time in Taiwan. Ho (1978:153) reported that “… the fertiliser/rice barter ratio for
aluminium sulphate, the most widely used fertiliser in Taiwan, fell from 1.5 kg of rice per kg of
ammonium sulphate in 1949 to 0.9 kg in 1960 and 0.53 in 1972.” While fertiliser was provided
by the NACF to Korean farmers at prices below domestic fertiliser production costs during the
period under review, the data do not reveal a comparable downward farm-gate price trend as
noted for Taiwan. Rather, Moon (1984:75-76) concluded that “…Korean farmers … have paid
high fertiliser consumption taxes …” In effect, Korean farmers helped to subsidise the domestic
fertiliser industry which was the starting point for the petrochemical component of Korea’s
heavy industrialisation drive in the 1970s.
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The more favourable terms of trade for fertiliser in Taiwan may be indicative of relatively
more effective FA articulation of farmer interests within the government bureaucracy. de Lasson
(1976:245-246), for example, attributes this positive outcome from the farmer-members’
perspective to greater FA ability to make “suggestions” to government about policy changes that
farmers favoured.
In terms of marketing services, neither the FA nor the NACF had stellar records with
regard to self-initiated marketing activities. Evaluation studies (de Lasson 1976:268,339; Brake
et al n.d.:31,36), completed in the 1970s, indicated farmer dissatisfaction with FO performance
in developing stable market outlets for cash crops. This was one of the most glaring weaknesses
of FA and NACF operations, as both FOs had difficulty establishing cooperative marketing
outlets that facilitated farm household diversification into higher value commodity production.
In the NACF case, government attempts to use the NACF to encourage crop
diversification had negative consequences for organisational legitimacy among farmer-members.
A particularly painful example was the infamous “sweet potato” incident in 1965 (Hans et al.
n.d.:33). As part of a government attempt to promote the local production of sweet potato inputs
for industrial alcohol manufacturers, the NACF was ordered to allocate production quotas to
farmer-members in traditional sweet potato production areas with promises of favourable
producer purchase prices. Due to budgetary shortfalls the government failed to honour its
purchase commitment to the NACF. There were several unruly protest demonstrations at NACF
offices in affected regions, generating widespread negative publicity for the NACF and
damaging farmer-member confidence in the organisation. In Taiwan, however, this type of crop
promotional activity, orchestrated by the FA, seems to have been more successful. Stavis
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(1974:83-84), for example, cites successes in FA involvement with high value mushroom and
asparagus export production, which provided significant income increases for farmer-members.
B.

Extension Services
While extension departments were important components of both the FA and NACF

organisational structures, extension outreach activities were quite different in each FO. In
Taiwan, the central government placed responsibility for agricultural research with the provincial
research department. This department developed new technologies and passed them on to the
FAs for testing and diffusion. In Korea, by contrast, primary responsibility for both research and
extension were housed in a separate agency, the Office of Rural Development (now the Rural
Development Administration), administered by the MAFF. This meant that the FAs in Taiwan
were actively engaged in a variety of agricultural technology improvement projects, whereas the
NACF’s role was much more limited in terms of technology promotion and diffusion. In
describing what the NACF “guidance bureaux” (the extension department) did, the Korean
Agricultural Sector Study (KASS) evaluation reported that “NACF field personnel tend to be
generalists and guidance activities are concentrated on developing annual plans and on
implementing the lending program and collecting loans.”(Brake et al. n.d.:36). By contrast, in
Taiwan extension agents were conduits for strategic technical components of improved farming
practices such as improved seed varieties and livestock reproduction techniques. Stavis’ analysis
(1974:81-85) of FA extension activities affirmed patterns of easy communication between
extension agents and farmer-members, facilitated by the fact that many extension agents were
themselves farmers.
Brandt’s (in Ban, et al.1980:270) observations on typical Korean communication patterns
in extension work is illustrative of important procedural differences in the two countries. He
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reported that village heads were often summoned to township offices to meet rural guidance
(extension) officers. The officers relayed advice to the village leader who then went back to his
village and imparted this advice to farmers. By contrast, FA extension agent procedure was
often to go to SAU (Small Agricultural Unit) meetings of FA farmer-members in the villages.
This procedure reveals not only the more participatory nature of extension program
communication patterns in Taiwan, but also that this pattern of small group FA social interaction
about farming matters of common concern undoubtedly increased farmer-member identification
with the FA as “their” association and enhanced elements of COOP behaviour.
This responsiveness was organisationally reinforced by the way in which extension
activities were funded. Township level units were responsible for funding part of local level
extension activities out of FA operating profits. Kwoh (1966:11) reported that in 1962 total
expenditures for FA extension services were funded from the following sources: 14.6 percent
from membership dues and contributions; 31.7 percent from extension service fees; 13.2 percent
from the net profits of FA business operations; 8.1 percent from other sources; and only 32.4
percent from government subsidies. This substantial degree of internal financing meant that
local TFAs had some voice in what kind of extension activities were supported and that TFA
officials could be held accountable by the membership for services performed, enhancing the
incentives for efficiency. de Lasson’s report (1976:255) indicates that this autonomy resulted in
rural development initiatives in both farming and non-farming activities.
The ability of local level FAs to become involved in a range of non-agricultural
development activities (see Ranis and Stewart 1993) was absent in the NACF system. In fact, to
the extent that the NACF guidance bureaux were involved at all in rural development promotion,
they were enlisted by the MAFF and the Ministry of Home Affairs to help implement high
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profile national projects such as the Tongil high yield variety diffusion effort (see Burmeister
1988) and various village improvement schemes implemented as part of the later vintage
Saemaul rural development initiative (see Brandt and Lee 1979), both of which were unpopular
with many farmer-members. NACF’s participation as an implementation agent in these national
mobilisation campaigns indeed damaged its credibility as a farmer-member-oriented organisation
responsive to member needs and preferences.

VI.

Conclusions
We should start by emphasising that both countries had very good agricultural

performance, and in both countries one reason for this was the effectiveness of their FOs.
However, Taiwanese agricultural performance was somewhat better than that of Korea, and its
rural development appears to have been more equitable. While both FOs were primarily
organised in a hierarchical P/C fashion, in this chapter we have pointed to a number of
organisational and other differences that led to the Taiwanese FAs having more COOP elements
than the Korean NACF. This, along with other differences, may account for the better
performance of Taiwanese agriculture and also contributed to the undoubted greater success of
Taiwan’s rural non-agricultural activities.
The co-production literature (see Evans 1996) provides ideas that help us theorise about
linkages between group behaviour, parastatal organisational structures and organisational
performance. The external macro-political environment in post-WWII Korea and Taiwan,
coupled with the ability to build on the rural organisational infrastructure left over from the
Japanese colonial period, elicited a parastatal organisational response to agricultural service
needs in the two countries. This political economy environment systematically infused the P/C
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mode of group operation into the FA and NACF systems, especially with regard to strategic
business activities “entrusted” to the FOs by the two central governments. A co-production
synergy was established between the state, the FOs, and their farmer-members, as state agents
had the power to mobilise resources that enhanced FO organisational effectiveness, e.g., the state
was able to secure supplies of needed agro-inputs and credit valued by FO farmer-members,
while the FOs had the dense organisational infrastructure needed to deliver these strategic inputs
to millions of minifarm households, many of which had been economically empowered by the
post-war land reforms. This relationship was based on resource complementarities between state
agencies and the FOs. The P/C mode of operation was instrumental in establishing this
complementarity through vertical coordination relations between state agencies and the FO
delivery system.
But complementarity is only one half of the co-production synergy equation
conceptualised by Evans (1996). The other essential component is social embeddedness. That
is, co-production synergy also requires notions of shared projects between parastatal (or other
state-fostered) organisations and a recipient clientele or membership group. In the context of FO
operations, to the extent that FO staff and farmer-members seem to be part of the same local
society, are perceived as social equals, and feel comfortable working together to achieve
common goals, we can speak of socially embedded relations between them. Embeddedness
promotes more efficient service provision by facilitating horizontal information flows within the
organisation, by providing a degree of voice to the membership or clientele, and by promoting
ideas among the membership about their right to monitor performance.
The major difference between FA and NACF organisational effectiveness resided in the
greater degree of embeddedness that characterised the FA system, making the FA’s co-
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production synergy relationships more robust than those of the NACF. In group behavioural
terms, greater embeddedness within the FA system elicited stronger COOP modes of group
operation and greater efficiency. This meant that the operational rigidities associated with P/C
organisational attributes were modified in more flexible and responsive directions. As indicated
earlier, both the macro-political economy environment and the external policy environment were
responsible for this organisational difference.
As a cautionary postlude, we must reiterate that our study encompasses an earlier period
(1960-1980) of FA and NACF institutional history, focusing largely on an era when agriculture
was still the dominant sector in both economies. Given the different problems agriculture now
faces in both countries (see Bain 1993; Burmeister 1992; Davison 1993), it might be argued that
neither FO has been especially effective in facilitating farmer-member adjustment to the drastic
decline in the relative role of the agricultural sector, to rapid domestic development, and to a
globalising world economy. Bain (1993) and Davison (1993) describe a mostly negative FA
metamorphosis characterised by increased factional politicisation and rent-seeking, as agriculture
is increasingly subsidised instead of taxed. Burmeister (1999) sees positive changes afoot in the
contemporary NACF, with an increasingly responsive organisation sensitive to farmer-member
concerns about the future of Korean agriculture. The assessment of how the Taiwanese and
Korean FOs have dealt with agricultural adjustment issues in the 1980s and 1990s requires
another analysis. Our comparative study remains, we believe, however, highly relevant to
developing countries at earlier stages of development.
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